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CHAPTER 10
The Resistance Threshold 
to the Amalgamation of Jurisdictions: MP’s 




Territorial and institutional reforms are continually being implemented 
around the world (Aulich 1999; Hanes et al. 2012; Jacobs 2004; Wollmann 
2010; Kettunen or Vakkala et al. in this volume). They are the result of 
trade-offs between creating larger political entities which allow for more 
efficiency through economies of scale and reducing spillover effects, and 
smaller political entities that are more responsive to the individual citizen 
(Dearlove 1979). Many federalist countries promote jurisdictional amal-
gamations at the subnational level. In the case of voluntary amalgamations 
in Switzerland, the decision to do so in many cases requires a majority of 
local decision-makers to accept changes to jurisdictional boundaries. Such 
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proposed mergers may meet vigorous opposition from locals who favour 
closeness to their government and jurisdictional borders that signal a spe-
cific identity. Amalgamating with another community can seem tanta-
mount to a loss of identity and an end to a unique history.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the reluctance—or the readi-
ness—to join another entity and social group in the context of rationally 
justified jurisdictional amalgamation. The analysis first considers the issues 
raised by existing cooperative ventures between jurisdictions, which aim to 
take advantage of economies of scale or reflect answers to growing organ-
isational weaknesses. The downside is that cooperating can lead to a loss 
of control since part of the budget resources become earmarked to finance 
joint ventures. Amalgamation can be seen as a way to recover the lost con-
trol over the budget whilst making economies of scale and the internalisa-
tion of spillovers possible. Although locals may consider it a threat to their 
social identification.
More specifically, the aim is to locate the ‘resistance threshold’ to amal-
gamation and which factors influence the location of the threshold. This 
empirical investigation uses a survey conducted among the members of 
parliament in two Swiss cantons.
This chapter contributes to the literature on fiscal federalism, and to 
that of governmental amalgamation. To the best of our knowledge, the 
trade-off between the control over the budget and the social identification 
has not yet been investigated.
Section 2 briefly surveys the literature on cooperation between subna-
tional jurisdictions and the theoretical implications of amalgamating them. 
Section 3 discusses Switzerland’s institutions and why the country is a 
good exemplar. Section 4 summarises the organisation of the survey. 
Section 5 presents the resistance thresholds elicited from respondents, 
which are analysed in Section 6 to model the factors that influence them. 
Section 7 concludes the Chapter.
2  LIterature and HypotHesIs
Functional territories, ones in which individuals and firms actually operate, 
are today often no longer congruent with the boundaries of existing juris-
dictions (Keating 2013; Schraepen in this volume). This unbundling pro-
cess (Ruggie 1993) has increasingly jeopardised the fiscal equivalence 
principle described by Olson (1969): the three circles of fiscal policy—
those who decide, those who benefit, and those who pay—coincide less 
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and less, creating negative externalities (spillovers). Territorial fragmenta-
tion also hardly allows individual jurisdictions to exploit economies of 
scale and the provision of public services becomes inefficient (von 
Hagen 2002).
The literature offers various responses: financial transfers, outsourcing, 
horizontal intergovernmental cooperation, and amalgamation of jurisdic-
tions (Blåka 2017). This chapter, however, contributes to this area of the 
literature from a different perspective. It questions how local decision- 
makers trade off a horizontal cooperation that produces a ‘democratic 
deficit’ on the one hand for the jurisdictional amalgamation that involves 
a loss of identification on the other.
Horizontal cooperation between neighbouring jurisdictions provides a 
technical answer to the unbundling by creating intergovernmental joint 
ventures.1 It hopefully allows venturers, that is, individual governments, to 
gain access to economies of scale since the area of provision is extended for 
the public service concerned (e.g. education, transportation, housing, 
water protection). Thus, spillovers should be internalised, with the circle 
of the decision-makers coinciding with that of the users and the taxpayers.
However, Dafflon (2013), for example, argues that horizontal coopera-
tion creates difficulties by inducing individual governments to lose part of 
their own control over the budget to the joint venture organisation. Each 
government is in the position of a purchaser with a limited possibility to 
express its views and to control the expenditure. The expenditure is 
divided between the venturers and each are expected to bow to finance its 
share. Local decision-makers lose part of the control they previously had. 
Thus, a ‘democratic deficit’ appears (Court of Auditors 2016). Of course, 
some civil servants or one or two members of the executive branch of each 
cooperating government participate in the governing body. However, 
such governing bodies hardly provide the kind of democratic legitimation 
a legislative body would provide.
The amalgamation of subnational public sector entities—in particular 
municipal mergers—also offers an answer to the unbundling, as shown in 
several studies in various countries, for example, Aulich (1999), Vetter and 
Kersting (2003) or Wollmann (2010). Most studies consider that it guar-
antees better democratic accountability than horizontal cooperation. 
Indeed, since it is larger than the pre-existing jurisdictions, an amalgam-
ated jurisdiction offers a better fit to the functional territories that house-
holds actually inhabit. The scope of democratic decision-making better 
matches that of users and taxpayers (Dafflon 2013).
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Even though rationally justified, many proposals to merge jurisdictions 
are vigorously opposed (Hanes et al. 2012). The social identification the-
ory developed by Tajfel and Turner (1979) explains this resistance. People 
categorise themselves in groups that provide a sense of social identity and 
a source of self-esteem. Belonging to a jurisdiction generates identification 
by providing the in-group with a common territory, a common name or 
culture compared to an out-group in another jurisdiction. The amalgama-
tion of both groups—in and out—disrupts the differentiation process and 
undermines the self-esteem of members of the in-group. Amalgamation 
dampens local identification and is often perceived by citizens as a loss of 
satisfaction (Soguel and Silberstein 2015).
The phenomenon of differentiation implicitly underpins the ‘strong 
nucleus’ technique developed by Dafflon (2000). The foundation of the 
technique is that a jurisdiction usually cooperates horizontally with juris-
dictions in which people share at least roughly the same views regarding 
public service provision as those of its own people. Populations mix 
through cooperation projects and get acquainted. The higher the number 
of jointly provided services between two jurisdictions, the less the differ-
entiation and the less likely individuals are to oppose an amalgamation.
Based on this literature, we propose the following hypothesis:
The stronger the cooperation through joint ventures between jurisdic-
tions, the more decision-makers lose control over public service pro-
visions and the budget and, in turn, the higher the likelihood they 
would accept amalgamating with the other jurisdiction.
Our hypothesis stems from two changes triggered by horizontal coop-
eration. The first is that horizontal cooperation jeopardises the control 
over the budget and amalgamation enables decision-makers to recover the 
power to decide. The second is that horizontal cooperation gradually lev-
els-out differences between populations of cooperating jurisdictions and 
paves the way towards amalgamation.
3  InstItutIonaL Background In swItzerLand
Switzerland’s major subnational political institutions, the cantons, are 
responsible for providing many public services. They make extensive use 
of horizontal cooperation to provide them efficiently. From the time mod-
ern Switzerland was founded in 1848 to 2003, no less than 733 
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intercantonal agreements (Konkordate) have been reached (Schöni 2005). 
These agreements currently face mounting criticism. According to Rühli 
and Rother (2017), cantonal parliaments do not look favourably on addi-
tional intercantonal joint ventures since it means a loss of power with 
respect to the executive branch of the cantonal government. According to 
Sciarini and Bochsler (2006), most existing agreements were contracted 
between only two cantons, with geographic proximity, language, and reli-
gion playing a role. No cantons have yet merged, though some scholars 
have argued for it (Rumley 2010), and several official reports have been 
published. Since 1969, only six efforts to merge cantons have been 
launched, some failing at a very late stage when rejected in a popular ref-
erendum.2 In the area of our survey (i.e. the cantons of Jura and Neuchâtel 
in northern Switzerland) merger efforts were also unsuccessful.
By comparison, many municipalities have amalgamated over the same 
period. Calciolari et al. (2013) have argued that the loss of control over 
the budget triggered by the proliferation of joint ventures between munic-
ipalities is an important driving force. Small municipalities are commonly 
involved in a dozen or so of such agreements in order to provide various 
public services. Municipal officials often refer to this phenomenon as the 
‘empty shell’ syndrome.
Each joint venture is unique, with its own organisation, personnel, and 
budget, often owning its own infrastructure or even legally authorised to 
take out loans. Operating costs are split between the venturing jurisdic-
tions, which raises the question what degree of control each jurisdiction 
still retains over the services provided and the level of expenditures.
4  survey
We mailed out a questionnaire we designed that was meant to elicit the 
‘resistance threshold’ of respondents.3 Our focus was on the neighbouring 
cantons of Neuchâtel (180,000 inhabitants) and Jura (70,000 inhabit-
ants). They were chosen because their potential amalgamation has been 
discussed and because they already collaborate in policy areas including 
education, health, data protection, public safety, and river management. 
The questionnaire was sent to all members of the two cantonal parlia-
ments. They have annual debates about their canton’s budget and are thus 
aware of the degree to which exiting intercantonal joint ventures limit 
their budgetary room to manoeuvre.
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We limit ourselves to presenting here the two questions related specifi-
cally to the resistance threshold. The first was: “Above which share of the 
canton’s expenditure that would escape budgetary discussion at the can-
tonal level could you contemplate an amalgamation?”. Respondents were 
asked to tick one of ten boxes, graduated from 0 per cent to 100 per cent; 
100 per cent represented a situation in which all government activities 
would be shared and 0 per cent would be situation of no cooperation at 
all. The second question was: “Above which share of the canton’s expen-
diture that would escape budgetary discussion at the cantonal level would 
you consider an amalgamation of cantons to be indispensable?” Again, 
respondents were asked to tick one of ten boxes, graduated from 0 per 
cent to 100 per cent.
The survey was conducted during the second quarter of 2015. 47.3 per 
cent of the 91 MPs from the Jura and 39.1 per cent of the 151 MPs from 
Neuchâtel replied, generating an overall response rate of 42.2 per cent, in 
other words, 102 of the 252 MPs. The item response rate was lower as 
given questions were not always answered.
5  eLIcIted resIstance tHresHoLds
Figure 10.1 is based on the responses from the 78 MPs who answered 
both ‘threshold’ questions. The vertical axis shows the cumulative fre-
quency; above 50 per cent (0.5) means a majority of the responding MPs 
is reached (dotted line). From a 50 per cent uncontrolled expenditure 
share, the majority of the responding MPs could contemplate cantonal 
amalgamation and this share needs to reach at least 60 per cent of the 
budget before the majority of the respondents stated that an amalgama-
tion is indispensable.
The situation is almost the same when analysing the cantons separately. 
From a 50 per cent share of expenditure that would be uncontrolled, the 
majority of the 30 MPs from the Jura who answered both ‘threshold’ 
questions, and 48 from Neuchâtel, could contemplate amalgamating the 
cantons. The share of the budget needs to reach 60 per cent for Jura and 
70 per cent for Neuchâtel MPs before most respondents state that amal-
gamation is indispensable. This finding suggests that a decision to amal-
gamate is achievable when the identified budget share is perceived as no 
longer under parliamentary control.
However, the current share of expenditures relative to intercantonal 
collaboration in Neuchâtel is actually about 5 per cent. At such a low level, 
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it is hardly surprising that a movement towards an amalgamation has 
remained unsuccessful.
6  ModeLLIng tHe resIstance tHresHoLd
An econometric model was estimated in order to identify which variables 
have an impact on the elicited thresholds. The indispensable amalgama-
tion threshold was used as the dependent variable. Given that the thresh-
old is a percentage (a limited dependent variable constrained between 
values of 0 and 1), a two-limit Tobit regression model was used to allow 
for both upper and lower censoring. After dropping all missing values for 
the different variables, 51 observations remained. Various checks were 
conducted to ensure our results were robust with respect to alternate spec-
ifications and that the model has good explanatory power. Table  10.1 
presents the results for the statistically significant variables only.4
Fig. 10.1 Cumulative frequency of the elicited thresholds for a conceivable and 
indispensable amalgamation (N = 78)
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 1. In line with our hypothesis, the elicited threshold is significantly (at 
a 0.01 level) higher when the respondents agree that increasing 
intercantonal cooperation reduces the control over the budget. This 
suggests that the threshold is lower for MPs who perceive horizontal 
cooperation as inducing a democratic deficit.
 2. Respondents who indicate beforehand that they would be ready to 
consider amalgamation seem to give a lower threshold than those 
who say they’re not prepared in principle to merge. This reflects the 
principle- based reluctance—or conversely—the readiness of MPs to 
consider amalgamation, independent of a specific level of threat to 
budget control. The variable is only significant at a 10 per cent level. 
It nevertheless suggests a reluctance, possibly caused by attachment 
to the canton and social identification. This is in agreement with 
existing literature (e.g. Zimmerbauer and Paasi 2013) and the puta-
tive explanations given when a merger proposal is rejected in a 
referendum.
 3. Additionally, significantly lower amalgamation thresholds (at the 
0.01 level) are elicited from MPs who regard intercantonal coopera-
tion generally and a priori justified. It suggests that MPs who find 
Table 10.1 Tobit Regression Model explaining the threshold for an indispens-
able amalgamation (dependent variable)
Explanatory variables (significant variables only) Coefficient Robust Std. 
error
1. Cooperation reduces the control over the budget 
(−2 = ‘fully disagree’; +2 = ‘fully agree’)
–0.082*** 0.026
2. Readiness to consider amalgamation (yes = 1, 0 
otherwise)
–0.150* 0.077
3. Cooperation is generally and a priori justified 
(−2 = ‘not at all’; +2 = ‘yes, absolutely’)
–0.122*** 0.036
4. Number of parliamentary debates on cooperation 
projects between cantons (0 to 10)
0.062*** 0.019
5. Number of years in canton (numerical) –0.007*** 0.001





R-squared (OLS robust model) 0.542
***p < 0.01, *p < 0.10
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cooperation justified per se foster amalgamation through a decrease 
in their threshold.
 4. However, MPs who have actually been confronted with intercan-
tonal cooperation during parliamentary debates are more critical. 
Indeed, the higher the number of parliamentary debates dealing 
with cooperation projects between the two cantons the respondent 
has participated in, the higher the elicited threshold (0.01 signifi-
cance level). This may indicate that an asymmetry of information 
exists between freshly elected MPs and their more experienced 
colleagues.
 5. The threshold decreases slightly but significantly with the number of 
years the respondent has spent in the canton. This result suggests 
that newcomers to a canton are slightly less willing to accept an 
amalgamation. This may be because they need to construct a local 
identity for themselves. This is in line with previous findings.
 6. Interestingly, belonging to a minority party seems to increase the 
resistance threshold, although at a level of significance of only 10 
per cent. Consistently, MPs from a minority party should express a 
stronger fear of amalgamation because they incur a higher risk of 
losing political power, that is, being lost in the crowd of a large 
population.
7  concLusIon and outLook
The likelihood that an amalgamation with other jurisdictions would be 
accepted increases when share of the budget earmarked to finance joint 
ventures increases. Our study shows that when the share of the canton’s 
expenditure escaping the budgetary discussion exceeds 60 per cent, a 
majority of the respondents state they would consider amalgamation indis-
pensable. The estimated regression model further supports the hypothesis 
that a perceived democratic deficit triggered by extensive joint ventures 
lowers the threshold. Although at a level of significance of only 10 per 
cent, an intrinsic reluctance to consider amalgamation increases the thresh-
old. This suggests that factors like cantonal attachment and social identifi-
cation has an impact on an MP’s decision to accept a merger of cantons.
From a policy outlook, this chapter provides an explanation—and a 
prediction—for the high rejection rate of proposed amalgamations 
between cantons. In countries where merger decisions are in the hands of 
subnational parliaments, our study suggests a point at which policy- makers 
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should cease cooperation arrangements and argue for merger. Indeed, tak-
ing the mechanisms into account is of critical relevance for the future 
democratic legitimation of the decisions reached. In the Swiss cantons, the 
actual share of the budget earmarked to finance joint ventures stands at 
considerable distance from reaching the thresholds stated by majority of 
the MPs surveyed. Still even a level as low as 5 per cent is enough for some 
MPs to contemplate amalgamating cantons—though this is a very small 
minority.
Further, our results may explain why in countries where amalgamation 
between regions or municipalities have been enforced by the upper-tier, 
this decision had to be reversed, leading to a partition. Perhaps the resis-
tance threshold necessary to make an amalgamation acceptable had not 
been reached beforehand and will not be reached even in a distant future. 
Therefore the upper-tier should refrain to force the amalgamation of sub-
national jurisdictions unless strictly indispensable.
The key contribution is to identify a strong reluctance among certain 
cantonal MPs toward the idea of merging neighbouring cantons. Evidently, 
when cooperation and partnership arrangements between cantons reach a 
relatively high level, some MPs seem more willing to contemplate merger, 
perhaps in part due to perceived losses in the control over budgetary deci-
sions. The results may help understanding the implications of any amalga-
mation plan, including at the European level. Conversely, they also 
contribute to anticipating the centrifugal forces that may develop in the 
future of federalism when the share of earmarked resources in the budget 
increases for joint ventures initiatives.
Nevertheless, the study is limited by its inherent hypothetical nature 
and its limited number of observations. Further, although our framework 
can be generalised to any decision-maker of a jurisdiction (i.e. citizens or 
MPs), our empirical estimation is made with MPs. These latter might not 
have the same resistance threshold as citizens. However, it is not clear how 
their views differ regarding an amalgamation. It is worth noting that their 
position as MPs might be challenged after an amalgamation and this addi-
tional fear possibly inflates the identified resistance threshold.
notes
1. The International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS 8) define a 
joint venture as a binding arrangement whereby two or more parties (e.g. 
states) are committed to undertake an activity that is subject to joint control 
(e.g. provision of a given public service).
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2. Each time the debates revolved around putative advantages and disadvan-
tages of amalgamations. Among the advantages: efficiency gains in provid-
ing public services, reducing tax pressures and externalities due to better 
coordination of land-use planning, and greater prominence with respect to 
economic development. Among the disadvantages: fear of dominance by 
the larger party to the amalgamation, loss of political self-determination, 
loss of identification with the community, instability of institutions and bor-
ders, and weaker representation in the upper chamber of the national 
parliament.
3. For the details, see Soguel and Jaquerod (2018).
4. Detailed results are presented in Soguel and Jaquerod (2018). Insignificant 
variables are, for instance, the evolution of the budget share dedicated to 
intercantonal cooperation, the readiness of MPs to consider an amalgama-
tion independent of a specific level of threatened loss of budget control, the 
respondent’s gender, and whether the responding MP belongs to a major-
ity party.
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